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Designing a genuine EMU: 
Which “unions” for EU and Eurozone? 
Jacques PELKMANS1 
Abstract 
The initial ‘framing’ (in the summer of 2012) of the ‘genuine EMU’  for the wider public 
suggested to design  an entire series of ‘unions’. So many ‘unions’ are neither necessary nor 
desirable – only some are and their design matters. The paper critically discusses first the 
negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU, and subsequently assesses the fiscal and the banking 
unions  as accomplished so far, without going into highly specific technical details. The 
assessment is moderately positive, although there is ample scope for further improvement  
and a risk for short-term turbulence once the ECB has finished its tests and reviews.  
What about the parade of other ’unions’ such as economic union,  social union  and political 
union? The macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and possibly the ESRB have 
overcome the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness. The three components of 
‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy coordination and budgetary disciplines) 
have all been strengthened. The last two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a 
fundamental change in the conferral of powers to the EU/ Eurozone, with drastic and 
possibly very serious long-run implications, including a break-up of the Union, if such 
proposals would be pushed through. The cure is worse than the disease. Whereas social 
union is perhaps easier to dismiss as a ‘misfit’ in the EU, the recent popularity of suggesting a 
‘political union’  is seen as worrisome. Probably, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is, or, 
at best,  it  is a highly elastic notion:  it might be thought necessary for reasons of  domestic 
economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger common budget, for some EU tax power, for 
(greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-economic adjustment and for some ultimate 
control of the ECB in times of crisis.  Taking each one of these arguments separately,  a range 
of more typical EU solutions might be found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Just as 
‘fiscal capacity’ was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, 
now solved with a modest common Fund  and carefully confined but centralised powers, the 
author suggests that other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various 
aspects where seen as indispensable, including the political say of a lender-of-last-resort 
function of the ECB.  Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name ought 
to be pursued.  Yet, political legitimacy matters,  both with national parliaments and the 
grassroots.  National parliaments will have to play a larger role. 
 
JEL codes: E02, O47, N24 
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1.    Introduction and structure  
Ever since the 1970 Werner report, it is customary to utilize a single term to characterize the 
EU as an economic construct:  the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Of course, initially 
EMU was a distant ‘dream’. For two decades following Werner, it looked more like a ‘fata 
morgana’. This changed with the EC-1992 programme for the single market and the 1989 
Delors report on EMU. Today, 25 years after this daring report, some two-third of the EU 
lives and works under an EMU regime.  EMU is invariably supposed to include the single 
market and what is today the Eurozone. Both components have been pursued on the basis 
of a host of expected economic benefits which were expected to be further enhanced when 
the two parts were combined from 1998 onwards.  
When in May 2008, the EU celebrated “euro@10”,2  EMU seemed to work. Empirical 
economic analysis was capable of demonstrating some first economic benefits (besides 
shortcomings, to be fair). There was a reasonable expectation that, gradually, more EU 
countries would join the Eurozone, although doubts remained with respect to the UK and 
Sweden. Little did EU policy makers knew what would follow barely four months later. The 
financial, sovereign debt and economic crisis amounted to an existential test for EMU. It 
revealed significant design flaws as well as shortcomings in its implementation. After first 
addressing the most obvious regulatory weaknesses and desperately attempting to fend off 
one financial market panic after the other, the fundamentals of EMU had to be re-
considered seriously. Difficult and sensitive strategic choices became inevitable for national 
governments and the EU institutions. A new and better EMU had to emerge from the ashes 
of EU’s triple crisis. In the summer of 2012 the European Council began to focus on a 
“genuine EMU”. Whatever such a ‘genuine EMU’ might be, it strongly suggests that the EU 
leadership was searching for the ‘optimal economic design’ of EMU.  
The present paper discusses in a non-technical manner how this optimal economic design 
was ‘framed’ and communicated, and whether and to what extent this ‘genuine EMU’ makes 
economic sense for the EU. The initial ‘framing’ for the wider public suggested to design and 
pursue four ‘unions’, but in fact no less than six or seven! It will be shown that such an 
approach does not represent ‘optimal economic design’  as so many ‘unions’ are neither 
necessary nor desirable – only some are and their design matters a lot.  
Section 2 notes that a ‘genuine EMU’ is of cardinal importance, but that its framing had the 
effect of overselling it: it does not imply a parade of unions. Section 3 illuminates the 
negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU. If EU policy makers wish to avoid the discrediting of 
EMU by voters, the only alternative is to go for the enormous ambition of building a ‘genuine 
EMU’. Section 4 takes the view that the fiscal union is more or less in place by now. Because 
the EU has an EMU design where monetary policy is centralized fully, whereas (for profound 
political and constitutional reasons) fiscal policy remains national but under EU constraints, 
there is no point in asserting that fiscal policy ought to be centralized. It is therefore crucial 
to clarify as well what the EU fiscal union is not! Where the EU (or Eurozone) level requires 
                                                          
2  European Commisssion (2008); Buti, Deroose, Gaspar & Martins, ed.s, 2010 
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modest fiscal instruments of its own, credible solutions can be found without impinging 
more than marginally upon national fiscal sovereignty. Section 5 discusses the EU banking 
union and some of its technical details. The banking union is far from perfect and likely to be 
improved/ deepened over time. Section 6 is about serious EU issues connected to EMU, but 
which do not need ‘unions’ to address them properly. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.   Genuine EMU, important, yet oversold 
In the summer of 2012, EU strategic thinking began to take over from panic management 
and painstaking efforts to regain minimum confidence in financial markets.  The EU and the 
Eurozone in particular, had:  
(i)  bravely faced four years of permanent or newly erupting crises  (addressed via new EU 
funds and tight ‘troika-led’ control and oversight for the relevant EU countries, besides 
greater stringency of the Stability & Growth Pact and tougher role of the EU EcFin 
Commissioner);  
(ii)  engaged in frantic legislative activity on bank solvency rules, supervisory ‘standards’ 
(especially capital requirements), registration and monitoring of financial market players left 
free before (e.g. credit rating agencies; asset managers), bank bonuses, state aid for banks  
and counterparties for ‘derivatives’ trade (enhancing stability);  
(iii) introduced institutional changes hitherto taboo such as turning EU supervisory 
committees into EU Agencies, widening the powers of the ECB and establishing the 
European Systemic Risk Board.  
The Eurozone had barely been rescued and was still fragile at best. The most vicious aspect 
was the ‘deadly embrace’ of weak sovereigns in need of banks acting in support of them (by 
buying or keeping their bonds) and weak – in some cases, near-insolvent - banks loaded with 
depreciated government bonds of several Eurozone countries. This created a ‘doom loop’ 
that had to be broken for good. Would such banks be seen as no longer solvent, yet ‘too big 
to fail’ in the relevant country, the sovereign would have to come to the rescue, thereby 
further weakening its fiscal sustainability, causing higher interest premia, in turn 
undermining its fiscal position still more. The banks were deleveraging, but this very slow 
process (in a crisis) hindered them in giving credit or rolling over existing loans, causing the 
crisis to perpetuate.   
The EU internal market for financial services is now underpinned by wider and a more 
appropriate regulatory regime, but the damage of the crisis turned out to be severe: (i) a 
dried-up interbank market, (ii) (some) cross-border banks that had been ripped apart along 
national lines and (iii) increased financial market fragmentation together with massive 
repatriation of assets, the very opposite of what ought to underlie a monetary union.3  
Moreover, there were lingering doubts whether the institutional changes were sufficient or 
                                                          
3  See e.g. Sapir & Wolff (2013), Gros (2013e), IMF (2013) and ECB (2013) 
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credible for market players. A number of institutional reforms at EU or Eurozone level are 
intergovernmental and hence notoriously inefficient.  
Thus, in an unusually candid interview, Mr. Andrea Enria, Chair of the European Banking 
Authority (the new Agency in charge of supervision), complained bitterly about hopeless 
inter-governmentalism in bank supervision and resolution: “..the benefits of crucial stress 
tests…could be impaired if decision-making were not streamlined and nationalist tendencies 
contained. The EBA has to move away from consensus-based governance traditions… You 
need European decision mechanisms rather than having always a committee-type of 
decision in a crisis. Committees in a crisis don’t work because you have conflicts.”4 
The basic proposal for a ‘genuine EMU’ was designed in the summer of 20125.  However,  
van Rompuy framed this ‘genuine EMU’ as the result of four ‘unions’: fiscal union, banking 
union, competitiveness union and political union. On the face of it this sounds more precise 
than the traditional wisdom of improving the “E” of EMU, its ‘economic union’. With the 
message of van Rompuy, one might be led to think that the E of EMU was decomposed into 
three specific ‘unions’  complemented by a ‘political union’.  
However, upon reflection, one discerns that this framing is not convincing. First, EMU itself 
consists of two unions, economic and monetary, both treaty-based, and none of these other 
‘unions’ are mentioned in any EU or intergovernmental  treaty 6. Should this be interpreted 
as the replacement of ‘economic union’  which is anyway barely elaborated in the treaty, if 
not left undefined? If not,  what then is the relation of the E of EMU with this new parade of 
‘unions’? Second, nobody knows what a ‘political union’ is. There is a giant literature on the 
idea, but it is splintered into many directions. This is not to say that EMU and its implications 
are somehow a-political. Of course they are not, but the core issues are about political 
legitimacy and there are many ways to address this (see section 6). Third, the 
‘competitiveness’ union would appear to be a misnomer as will be shown in section 6.  
Finally,  there is some debate in Europe about a ‘social union’ or at least,  much greater 
priority for the social dimension of EMU. Again, a social union is deeply flawed for the EU of 
today, the importance and sensitivity of social aspects notwithstanding. This fundamental 
question will be dealt with in section 6.   
A ‘genuine EMU’ needs three ‘unions’, each with different degrees of centralisation: 
monetary union, fiscal union and banking union. In addition, secular imbalances over the 
current account create  exposure risks  possibly causing – in particular in the case of a 
‘sudden stop’ of external finance –  extreme disruption, with the upshot that the adjustment 
(of deficit countries) falls entirely on the demand side via contraction (as nominal exchange 
rate adjustment is no longer available). This relates to serious issues of systemic risks and 
                                                          
4 Financial Times, frontpage, November 18, 2013. He also noted that “…it was vital that more power was 
devolved to EU institutions…They [ EU lawmakers, JP] give us responsibilities but they put so many national 
safeguards on every task… that sometimes I am concerned we will not be able to perform them.” 
5 The reference in footnote 6. 
6 This is probably why the official submission to the European Council by the four presidents carefully avoids 
the term ‘unions’. Instead , they employ ‘frameworks’ and architecture. See ‘Towards a genuine EMU’, report 
issued on 25 June 2012, president European Council, SN 25/12. However,  the non-technical debate in the EU is 
often framed in terms of ‘unions’. For a typical advocate of this approach, see Maria Joao Rodrigues (2013).  
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financial instability, hence to be addressed in a credible and durable fashion. The 
combination of the macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), with some incentives in the margin as well, should be capable of 
preventing irresponsible bubbles or at the very least lead to ‘alerts’ which should cause 
financial markets to ‘price in’ the risks, whilst the Eurozone level will insist on reforms and 
eventually sanctions. A ‘genuine EMU’ also generates major issues of political legitimacy, 
hence, involvement, inclusiveness as well as transparency should not be taken lightly (see 
section 6).  
What a ‘genuine EMU’ does not need is a parade of ‘unions’ as discussed above. It confuses 
the debate and tends to oversimplify the policy choices. It also creates a danger of 
suggesting that the EU or the Eurozone turns into an ever larger collection of (presumably 
centralized) ‘unions’, or, becomes a fully-fledged federation or a super-state, neither of 
which are desirable nor necessary. With fairly modest and selective limitations of national 
policy autonomy  and specific, well-justified instances of centralisation, EMU can function 
properly. The only structural and difficult question is that not all the EU is in the ‘genuine 
EMU’ whereas all 28 EU countries are in the single market.  
 
3.   Negative fall-out of the crisis for EMU 
The ‘Great Recession’ has severely affected the EU economy and EMU in it. The flaws of and 
gaps in the EMU regime have worsened the crisis everywhere in Europe but especially in the 
weaker Eurozone countries. The ‘genuine EMU’ must have the capacity to better address 
future recessions and its design, rules as well as institutions ought to be able to help 
Eurozone countries to weather a crisis, not worsen it. Before discussing in some detail what 
the EU fiscal and banking unions imply, it is useful to give three reminders of how the crisis 
revealed shortcomings and flaws of the ‘incomplete’ EMU’.  
3.1   The EU versus the Eurozone 
The very term ‘EMU’ can only be reconciled with the EU as a whole if one assumes that the 
‘outs’ (EU countries not part of the Eurozone) are ‘on the way in’. If some countries stay out 
for ever (i.e. the UK and Sweden) and/or if the road to euro membership is very long for 
some other countries, complications inevitably arise.  
The common element is the single market. The ambition to further deepen the single market 
received a boost with the introduction of the euro, in particular for financial markets. 
Nevertheless,  financial markets and certainly retail banking have not been fully integrated 
before the crisis: bank mergers typically remained national, with some exceptions, mortgage 
markets are fragmented even inside the Eurozone  and retail services are largely national. 
With the coming of a ‘genuine EMU’, the question is whether the ‘outs’ are willing and able 
to join a renewed ambition of deepening financial market integration. In the case of 
supervision, the choices are starker still.  
As section 5 describes, the new supervision architecture in the EU (not just the Eurozone) is 
based on centralisation, which (before the crisis) had always been resisted by EU Member 
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States. The first step was the establishment of three EU Agencies on banking (EBA), 
insurance and securities services (ESMA). Although this should long have happened in the 
1980s or 1990s, without the crisis revealing sharply that supervision had failed both 
nationally and in terms of inter-Member-States’ cooperation and trust (in particular, in the 
Eurozone), the three Agencies would simply not have come into being.  
The UK filed a case7 before the EU Court of Justice on the one and only instance where one 
of these Agencies (ESMA) has a (conditional) emergence power (on stopping short-selling). 
The legal basis is Art. 114, EU (the internal market & harmonisation article), implying that 
qualified majority voting did suffice to pass the Regulation on ESMA. The reader is reminded 
of the bitter complaints of EBA Chair Mr. Enria about excessive inter-governmentalism in 
these Agencies. Had Art. 352, EU, been used instead, the UK would have vetoed this 
emergency power of ESMA or would have added safeguards that might frustrate quick 
action in rapidly moving financial markets. In other words,  the centralisation - meant to 
overcome ill-functioning and slow committees as well as lack of trust -  is still at risk of being 
undermined.  
However, in banking the problems for the Eurozone are so urgent and large8 that further 
centralisation became respectable in the Euro group. The rationale of transcending narrow-
minded and captured national  supervisors would both improve quality and – in one stroke – 
ensure the EU public interest, including the pre-emption of contagion and the protection of 
financial stability. The point is not new and had long been advocated by academics and 
think-tanks.  It applies as well to the ‘outs’  and some of them will join the newly centralized 
supervisory system which is open to all EU countries. But some will not, yet they have every 
interest to influence the design and operationalization so that the internal market for 
banking services is well served, without any Eurozone bias. These issues are more difficult 
than when EBA was established, which is clearly an EU-wide institution for the internal 
market. However, supervision cannot be credible without bank resolution powers. 
Therefore, the ‘ins’ versus ‘outs’ discussion has become  more burdened with the ambition 
of having an EU (or Eurozone) bank resolution  Agency with funds, backing up resolution 
when banks are no longer solvent (given supervisory prudential requirements). Logical 
though it is to Europeanise resolution together with supervision, the national sensitivity 
about bank resolution is great. Still,  the Eurozone countries are willing to go far and have 
entrusted ‘their’ ECB (although the ECB is an EU body!) with supervision of the largest banks, 
while taking the lead in the design of new EU institutions tasked with resolution. The 
solution found for the ‘ins’ versus ‘outs’ discussion is based on a number of safeguards 
which, altogether, would seem to be appropriate 9. 
                                                          
7 The ESMA case boiled down to the UK’s insistence that the ESMA power to stop short-selling (under strict 
conditions) violated the Meroni doctrine. The CJEU rejected this claim on 22 January 2014. Case C-272/12, not 
yet reported. See Pelkmans & Simoncini (2014) for a further analysis.  
8 But not only in the Eurozone, of course.  In Central Europe and the UK (Northern Rock; several mortgage 
banks; Royal Bank of Scotland) very serious banking issues emerged early in the crisis, not to speak of Iceland 
which is  in the EEA, hence in the single market of financial services.  
9 Following the Commission’s  summary, there are six safeguards : (i) the Banking Union is based on the single 
rule book (for supervision and prudential requirements) for the entire single market ; (ii) although the notion of 
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But there are other ‘divides’ between ‘ins’  and ‘outs’, especially when it comes to the outs 
from Central Europe. The ‘outs’ from Central Europe are under the treaty obligation to enter 
the Eurozone one day. Before the crisis,  this predicament generated a willingness to join or 
align domestic policies or (e.g. internal market) strategies with the Eurozone, especially on 
the basis of annual (convergence) reports from the Commission. Nevertheless, in the first 
five months of the crisis following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Central Europe was 
almost forgotten. Most banks of these ‘outs’ are owned by West European banks. The 
owners, themselves under huge pressures to recapitalize, were under great temptation to 
repatriate funds from their subsidiaries in new EU Member States to home. Upon an 
initiative of the EBRD in London, kept silent at first given the jittery financial markets at the 
time, these banks jointly committed to keep the funds in their subsidiaries, thereby 
preventing a much deeper slump in the Central European economies. Once this threat was 
realized, attention of the EU turned East and the EU (as well as the ECB)  joined in with the 
IMF for adjustment assistance in cases such as Romania, Hungary  and Latvia.   
The actual or potential ‘divide’  between the Eurozone and the ‘outs’ remains an issue and it 
will not go away. The Eurozone is dominant with its 18 countries  and its institutions; its 
resolve is by definition greater because it owns a ‘collective good’, the euro; and, what is 
often forgotten,  each one of the currencies of the ‘outs’ have a mere satellite status vis a vis 
the euro.  
3.2   Gaps and omissions of EMU revealed 
The literature on EMU has always been characterized by controversies. Nevertheless, when 
the Eurozone celebrated its tenth anniversary, the official analysis (e.g.  of the Commission) 
was relatively mild on shortcomings and gaps. Nowadays,  there is consensus  that the ‘old’ 
EMU was wrongly designed with respect to the links between market regulation, resolution 
and crisis management, on the one hand (e.g. prudential regulation, supervision, 
cooperation between national supervisors, resolution, contagion  and systemic risks), and 
macro-economic policy, on the other hand, while its regime on national budgetary discipline 
appeared to be insufficient10 . Moreover, it became clear that the constraints on the  powers 
of the ECB had to be relaxed significantly.  The ECB of 2014 can be said to have no less than 
ten tasks  more than at the outset in  199911, some having been introduced under day-to-day 
pressure of the early crisis,  other ones on a wider legal basis in the Lisbon TFEU treaty. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
home/host supervisors disappears for the Eurozone, it remains for non-participating EU countries (including 
colleges); (iii) the ECB works for the entire EU in its function of super-supervisor; (iv) the EBA will continue to 
develop the single market for banking; (v) the EBA Board of Supervisors has been reformed with the 
introduction of a double majority voting system (hence, a majority of non-euro area countries should be in 
favour, too); (vi) in the SSM (Single Supervisory Mechanism), a sort of non-discrimination clause has been 
inserted, in particular when non-euro countries participate in euro-denominated services. See European 
Commission, Economic Review of the Financial Regulation Agenda, SWD (2014) 1258  of 15 May 2014, pp. 
267/8. 
10 However, it is crucial to note that a lack of budgetary discipline did not cause or significantly worsen the 
initial crisis (except in the case of Greece, which already had a high debt ratio  and an expected deficit of no less 
than 6 % in 2009, when a new government found out that the deficit had been falsely underreported and, in 
fact, amounted to more than 12 %). Ireland and Spain enjoyed very low debt ratios and hardly deficits in the 
budget before the crisis hit.  
11 A careful survey by Darvas & Merler (2013)  brings this out. 
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the first two years of the crisis, the ECB played a prominent role in providing liquidity in 
ingenious ways.  Thus, already late 2008 banks could access any  ECB liquidity they wanted 
(if collateral was sound) at a fixed rate; later, two extraordinary LTROs (Longer Term 
Refinancing Operations) were set up with maturities far longer than usual (up to 3 years) up 
to some € 1000 bn. Collateral requirements were temporarily relaxed as well. Nowadays, the 
liquidity function of (malfunctioning) interbank markets as well as security markets has also 
been facilitated by temporary ECB so-called ‘outright monetary transactions’ (OMT) for 
countries under special assistance for sovereign debt risks (Greece, Portugal until April 2014, 
Ireland until December 2013; Spain as it draws from the ESM for banks). The preparedness 
of the ECB (under funding conditionality) to make OMT unlimited has calmed markets and 
reduced risk premia for these countries, without actually activating a single euro under OMT 
contracts! Ironically,  this highly effective and so far merely potential monetary power of the 
ECB – in fact, a pure lender-of-the-last-resort function which has only been announced, no 
more – has drawn fundamental criticism e.g. from the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court (having 
asked for a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on whether OMT is not illegal under EU law).  
The ‘old’ EMU turned out to have a far weaker prudential and supervisory system than 
assumed, simply because the rules in the 2000-2006 period had become too ‘light’, the 
national supervision exceptions increased to some 150 and – something that, given secrecy, 
could not be observed – the supervisory committees did not function properly when needed 
most. Also, the lack of EU resolution power caused every EU country to become ‘nationalist’ 
as it were, since only national tax payers could provide ‘fiscal capacity’ (to give state aids or 
to nationalize). One should also consider this set-up against the European tradition that 
banks cannot go broke12. The idea that banks were basically privately owned companies that 
ought to bear risks and pay for insolvency, remained at best a secondary consideration. This 
presumption has two negative consequences: first, it implies major implicit subsidies13 for 
greater risk taking (e.g. higher credit ratings than without the implicit government 
guarantee, hence, lower funding costs); second, it aggrandized the moral hazard problem of 
‘too big to fail’, with dramatic consequences for the debt position of many EU countries once 
the financial crisis arrived.  Hence sovereigns found themselves in the awkward position of 
having to rescue banks that, somehow, had not been supervised properly. With the ‘light’ 
prudential regimes, the ‘own-capital’ of banks had reduced to irresponsibly low ratios, 
sharpening the exposure to risks, yet, few if any authorities saw the onslaught coming.  
But with massive rescue operations, in fact, private debt was transformed into public debt, 
without the toxic assets being taken out (say, into a ‘bad’ bank, although recently this did 
occur more frequently). Because the extra public debt was so large, and the toxic assets 
were so widespread, the Eurozone (and to some extent, the EU as a whole) got saddled with 
weakened banks and weakened sovereigns. Of course, this alarmed financial markets as well 
as credit rating agencies, after first having ‘dosed away’ for years. In other words, when risk 
taking should have been ‘priced in’, it was not. Once it was priced in – forced by rating 
agencies and jittery markets – it severely worsened the crisis both for banks and national 
                                                          
12 Apart from the Herstatt bank in 1978  and BCCI in 1994, banks – other than very small ones - never went 
bankrupt in the EU, in sharp contrast to the US.  
13 In the range of € 59  - € 95 bn (or 0.5 % - 0.8 % of EU GDP). See European Commission (2014, op. cit.), p. 84 
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budget authorities. In turn, this created a ‘doom loop’ or deadly embrace14, perpetuating the 
crisis by frantic deleveraging15 and budgetary contraction, whilst financial markets remained 
extremely nervous with respect to risk premia. Surely,  this deadly embrace had to be 
broken once and for all. In short, state funding had to be taken out of bankruptcy and 
resolution procedures as much as possible, shifting responsibilities and risks back to owners 
and managers. 
Figure  1. Debt in the Eurozone : households, firms, states 
 
Source :  IMF (2013, p. 51) 
At the same time, EU budgetary disciplines were tightened further (partly pushed by 
financial markets) which became pro-cyclical and hence worsened the problem for a few 
years. And this happened in an EU economy where overall indebtedness was very high in 
many countries (see Figure 1): whereas 2012 overall indebtedness is highest in the four MED 
countries and Ireland, private debts in e.g. the Netherlands are much higher than in any EU 
country, and e.g. French corporate debts (in % of GDP) are much higher than in e.g. Greece, 
Italy or Germany. As Figure 2 shows, apart from the ‘deadly embrace’, overall indebtedness 
(that is, for the state, firms  and households) is in and by  itself dragging down economic 
growth. These are typically the kind of observations that would have to be made by the 
ESRB, would it have existed before the crisis. 
Yet, this was not all. Three additional problems had basically been ignored. One has already 
been touched upon: the vulnerability of banks in Central Europe (mostly, not part of the 
Eurozone). A perhaps even more serious gap in the ‘old’ EMU was the neglect of systemic 
risks, whether via permanent monitoring and surveillance of possible sources of later 
financial instability (such as bubbles), or, the assignment of the task to an EU institution.  
                                                          
14 De Grauwe (2011 ; 2013)  
15 In BIS (2013, p. 55), it is shown that, for continental banks, risk-weighted assets amounted to some 12 – 13 
times Tier-1 capital in 2007 – 2008 ; with deleveraging, this fell to around 7 times, end of 2012.  
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Figure 2. (EU) Economy-wide indebtedness is bad for growth 
 
Source : IMF (2013, p. 65) 
The ESRB meanwhile fulfils this function, with the power of confidential or even public 
recommendations. The links between the ESRB and the ECB as well as with the European 
supervisors should ensure that authorities remain on guard  and consider timely corrections 
or constraints for the demand and supply side. Third, the structural imbalances on the 
current accounts of the MED-4 countries, long financed by financial players in other 
countries of the Eurozone, were largely caused by a shift from the tradable to non-tradable 
sectors (such as construction, growing into bubbles) as well as by excessive wage increases 
far above productivity growth. As the latter are unsustainable, corrections are bound to 
happen. Nonetheless,  as long as such wage increases take place especially in booming 
sectors (despite low productivity growth) due to bubbles,  the correction will be postponed, 
perhaps too long.  Once, for domestic or external reasons, a re-assessment of investments or 
financing is undertaken, there is a serious risk of ‘sudden stops’ of funding, in turn prompting 
an immediate and severe crisis.  
In yet other cases (e.g.  the Netherlands, a long time fine performer in the EMU), private 
financing of housing was pushed to extremely high ratios of 120%  or even 130 % or 140%  of 
the market value of the house in good times  despite, or indeed precisely because of, 
secularly rising house prices in the 1990s and the 2000s. With the crisis lingering, house 
prices started to fall with a lag (a logical market reaction) causing some 1.3 million 
households to witness their property values sharply going down (a negative ‘wealth’ effect) 
while being stuck with very high monthly financing requirements. This wealth effect 
deepened the crisis in the country as savings were given priority and demand from many 
consumers fell drastically. In turn,  this led to the highest current account surplus of the 
Eurozone (in %) for several years now. Exactly when sustained demand from stronger euro 
countries should at least have helped the adjustment of MED countries somewhat via 
exports of goods and/or tourism and other services, this imbalance had the opposite result.  
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3.3   The EU lost its growth mission 
Traditionally, the EU growth mission was connected to the deepening and widening of its 
internal market, with the help of the relevant common policies to make the market ‘function 
properly’16. Much later,  this was complemented by wider EU strategies (e.g. the Lisbon 
process between 2000 and 2010; the EU2020 programme) under which EU Member States 
would cooperate in areas of national competences, expected to enhanced  productivity 
growth in Europe. With the Eurozone becoming operational, a long-term structural reforms 
agenda for euro countries (but also for all EU countries, yet with a lesser urgency) to 
improve the adjustment capacity of the currency area and stimulate convergence was 
pursued as well, be it with modest and partial results until the crisis.  
After five years of crisis, the EU seemed to have lost its ‘growth mission’. The internal market 
was steadily being deepened17 but in a slow and inconspicuous manner, yielding relatively 
small economic gains. Only with the Monti report18, a new ambition was generated. But the 
classical single market approach - sound in and by itself – had long become far too narrow. 
The crisis clarified in a painful way that suboptimal economic design, problematic quality of 
some EU rules (e.g. for financial markets) and of some weak institutions could severely 
impair trend growth. Moreover, severe constraints caused by the rigid two-tier structure of 
EU governance  were capable of wiping out many years of accomplished economic growth. 
The basic flaw in EU economic governance refers to the existing division of economic powers 
between the national and EU levels which is no longer based on what a functional 
subsidiarity test would suggest for the better functioning of the EU economy at large and the 
Eurozone in particular. Worse still,  the recovery is likely to be slow and the expected trend 
growth until (say) 2020 is bound to be below the already modest trend growth before the 
crisis (see Figure 3). There is simply no point in promoting soft EU2020 strategies (in an 
‘innovation union’. 
Figure  3. Worrisome economic trend growth of the EU 
 
Source :  European Commission (2013b) 
                                                          
16 See Pelkmans (2006), chapters 2 and 3 in particular.  
17 A survey of single market deepening between 1993  and 2010 is provided in Pelkmans (2011). 
18 Monti (2010), followed by the 2 Single Market Acts of 2011 and 2012 respectively.  
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or a ‘new’ industrial policy, etc.) and piecemeal internal market improvements, without first 
addressing these more fundamental questions of EU economic integration.  
The slogan ‘never waste a serious crisis’ is a pertinent ambition for the EU. It is  crucial not to 
consider the ‘genuine EMU’ debate as a mere technical debate about a better Eurozone. Not 
only is a lousy Eurozone also bad for the EU as a whole, but many of the issues which have to 
come to the fore in the Eurozone are often just as relevant (but perhaps slightly less 
pressing) in the EU-28. This is true, in particular, about the insufficient ‘reach’ or 
intrusiveness of the internal market in the economies of the Member States. The 
implementation of the 2006 horizontal services directive has clarified this in a stark 
manner19. After enacting this important directive, Member States jointly seized ‘ownership’  
of the deep implementation track over a period of four years, assessing no less than 35000 
legal services provisions in national laws and decrees, removing numerous restrictive or 
discriminatory clauses  and introducing around 1000  new laws or other secondary acts. 
Nevertheless, after this mega-effort, there are still doubts whether the directive is 
sufficiently intrusive inside Member States in all submarkets. Another telling illustration is 
found in the regular troika reports of notably Greece and to a lesser extent Portugal about 
their domestic reforms: amazingly, several reforms in these programmes revealed that the 
reach of the single market in some sectors simply had not been sufficient to introduce or 
stimulate effective competition and inter-sectoral adjustment, a necessary condition for 
growth and competitiveness. Detailed assessments of Italian reforms, even after the short-
lived Monti government, strongly suggest similar problems of a selective  delinking of the 
single market and national economies.  
Today’s two-tier structure of EU economic governance is not only inappropriate for the EU 
economy, it hides ‘systemic risks’ of structural underperformance which ought to be 
addressed. Selective instances of centralisation – mostly in the Eurozone,  but in e.g. 
banking, for all EU-28  countries – should be coupled with well-chosen mechanisms to 
circumscribe national regulatory and policy discretion where the economic case for 
structural reforms is widely accepted by (say)  the Commission, the OECD and the IMF.  It is 
not suggested to ‘impose’ such limitations. Yet, it should be  imperative for Member States 
not to read the broad economic policy coordination articles 20  with a legal mind set of how 
to minimize their practical impact in domestic politics, but, instead, be regarded as part of a 
joint economic evaluation of what the Union requires for growth. In this respect,  the 
European Semester is a step forward, as it is ‘Europeanising’ national parliamentary 
economic policy debates and doing this simultaneously in all EU countries, without 
suggesting more  centralisation.  
 
                                                          
19 In Mustilli & Pelkmans (2013) this point is elaborated in great technical detail 
20 Art. 120  and 121 of the TFEU. The first one comprises an obligation of Member States : “…shall conduct their 
economic policies with a view of contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union….  and in the 
context of the broad guidelines..”. Art. 121, TFEU ensures that national economic policies are not ‘stand-alone’ 
ones : “Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall 
coordinate them within the Council..”.  
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4.   Fiscal union, more or less in place ? 
The term ‘fiscal union’ may mean different things to different people. Whereas the case for 
central EU supervision of banks and their eventual resolution is strong  and convincing, the 
logic of establishing a fiscal ‘union’ is less straightforward and also depends on one’s  
ambition about EU integration beyond the proper functioning of the monetary union. The 
basic argument in favour of having a ‘fiscal union’ hinges on answering how to serve best the 
proper functioning of the monetary union and the (internal) banking market as a delicate 
aspect of it. The fiscal union in this sense belongs to the ‘Eurozone’ but might nonetheless be 
voluntarily adhered to by some of the ‘outs’.  
However, some economists and a few leading politicians (e.g. former Belgian Prime Minister, 
now MEP, Guy Verhofstadt) widen the role of a fiscal union to broader macro-economic 
stability policies. This additional role has a long history in  EU debates going back all the way 
to the 1977 Macdougall report advocating an EU budget of 5% or more of EU GDP in order to 
pursue EU-wide macro-economic stabilisation policies.  
More modest versions of an EU common employment insurance fund and/or a limited form 
of expenditure insurance can also be found21. However, this additional role of a fiscal union 
implicitly suggests that the Eurozone (or even the EU at large) should mimic a federal state 
EU-style or even the US to some extent, in that macro-economic stabilisation between 
countries (or states) is best assigned to a central budget. Or at least to some extent. In other 
words, the ‘old’ EMU with central monetary functions is held to be imbalanced as  fiscal 
policy should be centralized to some non-trivial degree as well.  
This argument is more political than economic. Politically,  it hinges either on a preference of 
‘more Europe’ in general, or, on a serious concern about a lack of support of EMU among EU 
voters following the crisis  and its negative fall-out. Therefore, many economists and others  
advocate some such additional EU fiscal role  and connect it with what is labelled ‘political 
union’. The political union would somehow have to generate political legitimacy and support 
in the electorates for EMU and its good and sour consequences. This is briefly dealt with in 
section 6.4.  
Economically, this debate goes back to the EMU debate of two decades ago22. The relatively 
large national budgets in the EU have considerable stabilisation capabilities, both via 
discretionary spending and via the so-called ‘automatic stabilizers’ (automatic, because in a 
recession, tax revenues decline and social payments increase). Given the large share of GDP 
of national budgets (unlike states in the US), this can be quite effective in smoothing 
demand over the cycle.  
If all EU countries do this during an EU-wide recession (and automatic stabilizers guarantee 
that in part), the EU economy will benefit, too. For this national stabilisation function to 
work well, national budget discipline (under SGP and the new six and two-pack rules) should 
                                                          
21 A recent note by IMF Staff (Allard et al, 2013) advocates some fiscal risk sharing via an insurance mechanism 
- hence, temporary transfers - based on purely economic arguments, but even these authors admit the 
‘political costs from ceding some national sovereignty over budgets’.   
22 See Gros & Thygesen (1992) for a survey.  
Jacques Pelkmans                                 Designing a genuine EMU: Which “unions” for EU and Eurozone? 
13 
 
guarantee that enough spending room has remained available before  the downturn arrives; 
moreover, there should be no nasty surprises such as the rescue of one or more banks 
(which assumes tougher prudential rules, supervision  and unbiased resolution power) which 
would undermine sound budget policies. Hence, for a ‘genuine EMU’ implying budget 
discipline and few, if any bank failures asking for rescue, the additional stabilisation 
functions of a fiscal union  are not compelling23.  
This is quite apart from the question of political feasibility of such a more ambitious fiscal 
union, which is zero at the moment. It is not hard to see why: Member States have been 
extremely sensitive about the EU budget (kept it at 1 % of EU GDP  for decades now)  and 
have consistently refused to endow the Union with even limited tax powers. Earlier 
proposals for a kind of macro-insurance mechanism have not even been put on the Council 
agenda. One should also realize that the political nature of the Union would change once tax 
powers are given to the EU. In a climate of rising euro-scepticism, pushing such ideas might 
even backfire. 
The ‘fiscal union’  helping the monetary union to function properly has three components: 
(a)  disciplining Eurozone (or EU-28) national budgets according to treaty provisions, the 
SGP, and its tightening via the six-pack and two pack rules. Essentially,  this implies zero 
budget deficits over the medium term and a debt ratio of 60 %  or decreasing to that level in 
an unambiguous fashion. The main economic reasons include the minimisation of (negative) 
fiscal cross-border spill-overs and the pre-emption of any political pressure on the ECB to 
loosen monetary policy for purposes of easier nominal debt relief (via inflation). In terms of 
debt in the longer run, it is about fiscal sustainability given ageing and health costs. 
(b)  the establishment at EU or Eurozone level of strictly limited and conditional common 
funds  for crisis management, be it for sovereigns with high debt ratios when financial 
markets are unwilling to buy bonds except with very high risk premia (which could generate 
vicious circles), be it for bank resolution and bridge finance as a necessary complement of EU 
level supervision. Note that the latter might be partly or wholly financed  by the banks 
themselves (building up over time) and/or via an EU-wide deposit insurance system.  
(c)  fiscal guarantees (or, backstop) of a common resolution authority’s decision to 
intervene, if  and insofar as privately financed common funds for crisis management might 
not suffice. Such guarantees are likely to come from Member States. Except for the 
beginning of bank resolution at EU level, when such funds still have to be built up, these 
guarantees might actually never be  used.  
 
 
                                                          
23 Daniel Gros (2013f) has added an additional economic argument causing one to be highly cautious when 
macro-economic stabilisation powers are advocated to be shifted (to some degree) to the EU level, in analogy 
with the US. Gros shows empirically that the federal macro-stabilisation effects in the US are actually quite 
modest, certainly compared with the impressive stabilisation effects of the US ‘banking union’ in the event of a 
financial crisis.  
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Figure  4. Eurozone budgetary discipline before the crisis 
  
Source :  European Commission (2008); left hand side, state debt / GDP ratios in % ; right hand side, deficits 
Since the latter two components are of direct relevance to ‘weak’ banks  and the first might 
be negatively affected by weak banks, the banking union and the fiscal union are twins. With 
the banking union (see section 5), the EU level was in need of its own ‘fiscal capacity’.  
The first component, national budgetary discipline, has been a prominent issue ever since 
the Maastricht treaty, incorporating the famous 3 %  (for ‘excessive’ deficits)  and 60%  (debt 
ratio) thresholds  for entry into the Eurozone. With the Stability & Growth Pact (SGP), this 
was made applicable also after adopting the euro, that is,  to existing members of the club, 
with the option of sanctions under Council control. This left something to be desired  as the 
threat of sanctions was perhaps realistic for small countries like Portugal and Ireland, yet 
was blocked for Germany and France in 2005. For this and other reasons,  the credibility of 
SGP was often called into doubt. Debt ratios of countries like Italy and Greece  went down 
only excruciatingly slowly  and Portugal turned out to be permanently in excessive deficit 
procedures, for example.  
Nevertheless, one ought to concede (see Figure 4) that the overall budget disciplines of 
Eurozone countries in 2007 was better than during the 1990s and even when the Eurozone 
started24. The weaknesses have been addressed in four of the directives/ regulations of the 
Six Pack of November 2011 and in the Two Pack of May 201325. The EcFin Commissioner 
(now Ollie Rehn) has been assigned special authority and duties of ex ante surveillance in the 
framework of the so-called European Semester. The latter aligns timing and relevant 
substance of national budget procedures, in a tightly coordinated fashion led by the 
Commissioner, seeking to ensure that national parliaments (when approving national 
budgets for the following year) duly consider and incorporate the disciplines and 
recommendations about fiscal sustainability agreed at EU level. This coordinated set-up in a 
joint calendar for all Member States generates political costs for neglecting the EU. In order 
to add credibility, 25 of (then) 27 EU countries signed an intergovernmental ‘Fiscal Compact’ 
                                                          
24 See European Commissison (2008). 
25 For a careful survey of this strengthened fiscal framework, see European Commission (2013a). 
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in March 201226. At the time, the Compact was seen as a necessary boost for the tedious 
political process of toughening ex ante surveillance. Indeed, by committing themselves 
firmly, Member States succeeded in concluding the Two Pack (overlapping with the 
Compact, for example making possible reverse qualified majority voting on all the steps of 
the excessive deficit procedure) with strong support of the EP. One accomplishment of the 
Compact is that (25) Member States must enact a national law imposing certain budget 
disciplines, thereby averting cheap accusations of a ‘Brussels diktat’.  
The second component of the fiscal union is the funding of a Eurozone crisis mechanism for 
sovereigns with high and/or rapidly rising debt (due to bank rescues) and extreme risk 
premia in the interest rates they have to accept to pay when  selling their bonds in capital 
markets. After a short-lived emergency fund, the permanent mechanism is the ESM, the 
European Stability Mechanism  with some € 500 billion available. Today, it pays the 
emergency funding for Greece and Portugal,  and until December 2013, Ireland. This is only 
done, however, once the troika of the European Commission, the IMF  and the ECB reports 
favourably (regularly) about the implementation of strict adjustment and reform 
programmes, and the Euro Group subsequently agrees and approves.  
The strict conditionality of the ESM has a deterrent effect on other possible ‘candidates’ 
such as Italy (high debt ratio  and a low capacity to reform) and Spain (depression-like 
unemployment and negative growth until 2014, plus some bank rescues, causing huge 
pressures on its budget). These countries have taken many measures in order to prevent 
having to ask for ESM funding. Of course, these initiatives go in the same direction but 
maintain a degree of discretion for domestic socio-political acceptance. For a while, it was 
(and possibly still is) unclear whether these two relatively big economies can return to 
growth quickly enough  and gradually improve their situation such that risk premia will start 
to fall based on improved economic fundamentals. Once Spain or Italy would have to 
request ESM funding, fears might grow that the ESM is too small,  and financial markets 
might become jittery again. It is for this reason that the OMT offer of the ECB is so 
important, as it has successfully calmed down the markets27. Spain did succeed in obtaining 
ESM funding for supporting Bankia (a near-failed merger of local savings banks), even though 
ESM funds are meant for sovereigns, not for (preventing) resolution of banks. However,  the 
connection between the Spanish budgetary predicament and the Bankia rescue is so close 
that this exception was allowed, in anticipation of the arrival of EU resolution powers.  
The funding and fiscal back-up of EU bank resolution power is no longer taboo. But the 
philosophy has drastically changed. As the treaty forbids ‘bail outs’, the ESM had to be 
drafted in ingenious ways  and rigorous conditionality was a logical implication. A new EU-
level arrangement for resolution stimulated a course of action that was first tried in the 
Cyprus banking crisis: called ‘bail-in’. It shifts responsibility for irresponsible risk-taking back 
                                                          
26 The treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance  of 2 March 2012 
27 De Grauwe & Ji (2014) show econometrically that, so far, the sharp decline in risk premia (hence, interest 
rates) for MED-4 counties since mid-2012 is not due to economic fundamentals improving, but solely to OMT. 
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to managers and owners of banks, and even large depositors (above € 100 000)28. When 
these means are exhausted, national fiscal ‘back-up’ comes in (under strict and new state aid 
rules) and only when this would still not suffice, complementary funding from the ESM is 
possible, if the bank can be made viable.  
The EU resolution regime consists of two pieces: a Single Resolution Mechanism and the 
Bank Recovery and Resolution directive (see also section 5). The critical point for the fiscal 
union is that ‘bail-in’ has now become an agreed principle, in other words, moral hazard is 
pre-empted and private equity, large depositors and managers’ destiny will presumably be 
incentivized to avoid failure. National state aid and subsequently, EU funds may come in, if 
and only if a merger or acquisition or restructuring enables the bank to remain viable, be it 
with some funding. However, the extensive resolution powers may further minimize or pre-
empt any public  funding by e.g. establishing a ‘bad’ bank  or via other arrangements. On the 
same logic, the EU funds for resolution will consist of bank-funded resources -  built up over  
a period of 10 years to € 55 billion. Only the fiscal back-up  consists of public money from 
taxpayers.  
As will be discussed in section 5, it is precisely in the early period of EU resolution – when 
funds are still small and the new EU supervisory regime will make itself felt – that public 
money might still be unavoidable. This would be due to the legacy of still too weakly 
capitalised banks. With the strict assessment by the ECB of the hidden risks in the 128 
largest banks in the EU, under way during 2014, it is possible that the so defined ‘capital 
needs’ of a number of these banks is outstripping the capacities of such banks to attract 
extra capital (or e.g. merge), so that the painful resolution choice might be between 
controlled unwinding of some banks and renewed public capital funding  (which would bring 
back the deadly embrace, if the latter is too big). We shall return to this tricky problem in 
section 5.  
Finally, it might be useful to clarify what fiscal union is not. As noted, it is not about an EU 
budget – or, as some suggest, a Eurozone budget – with stabilisation functions. There is, 
however, a possible though minor  link between a ‘genuine EMU’ and the EU budget: as 
domestic reforms, especially during a crisis, can be painful to the point of becoming 
unacceptable by voters, EU funding for a growth or investment agenda besides austerity 
measures may be a useful way to help the country with a quick turn-around back to growth. 
The fiscal union of the ‘genuine’  EMU is surely not about (EU) taxation and new ‘own 
resources’  for the Union, although one can make a good case for a much larger share of 
‘own resources’ in the total receipts of the EU.  This case has been made many times 
                                                          
28 More precisely, if a bank needs to resort to bail-in, authorities would first write down all shareholders and 
would then follow a pre-determined order in bailing in other liabilities. Shareholders and other holders of 
instruments such as convertible bonds and junior bonds would bear losses first. This is a citation from 
Commission Memo 14/294 of 15 April 2014  (as the text of the Single Resolution Mechanism  and of the BRRD 
(the Bank and Recovery Resolution directive, for all EU; the difference is essentially that the national resolution 
funds are pooled into a single Fund in the case of euro countries)  have not yet been published in the EU 
Official Journal by 1st of June 2014 (when this paper was finalised). The EP formally adopted the BRRD  and the 
SRM on 15 April 2014. Besides, it also adopted a harmonisation directive on national deposit insurance 
regimes.  
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before 29 but national governments choose simply not to listen to such functional arguments 
– for them, the EU budget is politicized (unfortunately, mainly by them, fearful of euro-
sceptical voters).  Their ‘contributions’ are framed as a burden for the national taxpayer, to 
be minimized, not as a normal expenditure in the EU public interest. Nevertheless, there is 
talk about Union bonds30, a kind of joint funding for national projects. Neither is fiscal union 
about big sums of (EU) money: it is mainly about budget discipline of the Member States, 
including longer-run fiscal sustainability, only residually about joint guarantees of the 
Eurozone countries and even less about the EU budget. Its overriding purpose is to ensure 
that the monetary union and the underlying single financial services market can function 
properly. 
 
5.   Banking union: why and what it takes? 
The EU banking union is a catchy name for answering the following question: what positive 
integration is required to make the internal market for banking services function properly. 
This includes the appropriate governance for pre-empting and managing systemic risks such 
as cross-border contagion or unwanted fiscal effects (as discussed in section 4). Banking 
union as an issue is therefore nothing new (other than the name). What is new is the 
changed mind set of governments, now willing to ‘go European’, although some more than 
others. The new mind set has two concrete consequences: (a) existing EU rules and 
coordination of banking supervision can be drastically improved, including EU-level 
institutions with a degree of centralisation; (b) EU supervision can be made credible by 
complementing it with EU bank resolution powers and the funding for it.  
Before elaborating on the banking union, it is important to realize that it is built to facilitate 
and enhance the functioning of the internal market for financial services, especially but not 
only banking31. This ambition can lead to justified forms of centralisation that might not have 
been envisaged initially. Indeed, the ultimate consequences of the ‘proper functioning of the 
internal market for financial services’, encompass a complete and effective bank resolution 
regime, with adequate funding. In turn,  this should break the ‘doom loop’ as huge extra 
public debt will no longer be forced upon the state when a bigger bank is failing.  
This sensitive centralisation has prompted many headlines  and discussions, understandably. 
In the heat of these debates,  the main reason for the selective centralisation remained out 
of sight:  a sound financial market in the EU for growth and competitiveness. Sadly, financial 
market integration  in the EU leaves much to be desired. First, even before the crisis, there 
were sub-markets which remained fragmented, such as mortgages, some other forms of 
consumer credit and retail banking services in the general sense; fragmentation also lingered 
due to ‘home bias’ in portfolio allocations in the EU and a strong domestic preference for 
                                                          
29 See for instance  surveys in Begg (2009)  and Begg (2011). 
30 Not to be confused with Euro bonds, which mutualize all national (past) debt as well 
31 In other words, accomplish the appropriate ‘positive integration’ in order to enhance the ‘negative market 
integration’ of free movement and the right of establishment in financial markets in the EU, as a source of  
higher economic welfare and, indirectly, by stimulating growth via deep, efficient and vibrant financial markets. 
The deeper such market integration, the stronger the case for a banking union. 
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bank mergers. Despite these integration deficits, financial market integration at first 
increased after the euro was introduced32. This is critical for improving monetary 
transmission in the Eurozone but it is also likely to lead to efficiency gains. Second, as noted 
before, during the crisis, financial market integration receded and fragmentation in several 
submarkets worsened (although this process stopped after OMT was announced – June 
2012 – and partially reversed 33 once plans for  banking union turned out to be credible).  
The EU banking union comprises four elements:  
a. a single (prudential) rulebook for banks, and in its wake, an EU single supervisory 
handbook for national supervisors; 
b.  pan-EU  (and EEA) banking supervision, led by the ECB and the EBA; 
c.  an EU-wide bank resolution regime (rules, an EU fund  and a resolution authority); 
d. an EU-wide deposit guarantee scheme,  preceded by the harmonisation of national 
deposit guarantee schemes. 
In the spring of 2014, the status is as follows : (a) is under way (and much progress has been 
made34 ) ; (b) has been enacted35, but the centralised ECB part is coming into force only by 
early 2015, with the run-up to this initiation during 2014 characterized by a tough 
preparation required by the ECB; (c) has been enacted by the EP on 15 April 2014 as a 
package both for all EU countries (the BRRD) and for Eurozone countries (SRM)36; (d) the EU-
wide deposit guarantee scheme has been put on the backburner (e.g. Germany is reticent), 
but a harmonisation of national schemes has been enacted on 15 April as well.  
This fourfold package is an amazing achievement in the light of the outright refusal to take 
such forms of functional centralisation serious until the crisis 37. Yet, given the design failures 
of EMU  combined with the ‘deadly embrace’ and  its now well-understood drastic 
consequences, many economists wonder  whether this package  is fool-proof. The short 
answer is that in the short to medium run, the package is rather vulnerable due to a 
significant sequencing problem to be discussed below. In the longer run, it is likely to be 
fairly robust, if the initial experience with the system would not cause too much damage to 
its credibility.  It would be even more robust if the EU resolution fund would be part and 
parcel of a sound EU-wide deposit guarantee system.  
                                                          
32 ECB (2008) 
33 In ECB (2014) this partial reversal is empirically shown for several financial submarkets. Also, the European 
interbank market – collapsed in the beginning of the financial crisis  –  is close to operating at the pre-crisis 
level. 
34 The present contribution cannot possibly go into the numerous details of this huge programme. A concise, 
yet rich summary is provided by the European Commission in Memo/14/352 of 15 May 2014  and its Annex. 
See also COM(2014) 279 of 15 May 2014  and the Commission’s SWD of the same date, quoted before.  
35 See Council Reg. n 1024/2013 of 15 Oct 2013, conferring specific tasks to the ECB, OJEU L 287/63 of 29 Oct 
2013, and, Reg. 1022/2013 of 22 Oct 2013 amending Reg. 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (etc.)  OJEU L 287/5  of 29 Oct 2013.  
36 Not yet published in the EUOJ.  See footnote 28.  
37 Even the 2009 De Larosiere report on the EU banking crisis, tough in its analysis of the weaknesses of 
supervision  and the far-from-single rulebook, was hesitant still in this respect. See also Lannoo (2009). 
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The crux in the short run is the gradual assumption by the ECB of its supervision of the 128 
large banks by preparatory scrutiny in the course of 2014. The ECB is bound to secure its 
high reputation by being a tough and prudent supervisor. This toughness does not only arise 
from the requirements it will impose (see below)  but also from the mere fact that it is a 
credible EU-wide rather than a national body, not suffering from inter-governmentalism (as 
the EBA still does). The latter two points are the very reasons why centralisation of 
supervision, certainly for big and networked banks, is functional and should be expected to 
be good for EU economic welfare. When searching for optimal economic design of EMU, this 
element is crucial, no doubt. But there might be a possible snag. The ECB will work, indeed 
will have to work38, closely with national supervisors. Dependent on how fragile some of the 
banks might be found to be  and how large capital shortages might be, given yet 
undiscovered risks and/or the still too low capital requirements, the ECB might find itself in 
the difficult position of having to be tough on the remedies without yet being in the position 
of triggering the Eurozone resolution fund, as it still has to be built up. This is akin to 
‘supervision without the ultimate fiscal capacity for resolution’,  which boils down to a 
renewed inter-governmentalism through the backdoor, at least initially, as only the Member 
States will initially have fiscal capacity.  
What are these preliminary requirements  in the run-up to fully-fledged ECB supervision?39 
With the fragile state of (some) European banks, three prior checks will be conducted: 
i.  an asset quality review, which has already started ; run by national supervisors under ECB 
guidance and direction; seeks to identify where  and how much, overvaluation (in the books) 
of assets’ market value of banks exists; 
ii.  balance sheet assessment for the 128 banks, based in part on i;  
iii.  new EBA stress tests, tougher than both the 2011 and 2012 ones.  
The idea is that banks which are severely undercapitalised will either (a) default as not viable 
without help (and bank resolution comes in), or (b) require public funding (but precisely that 
ought to be prevented or minimized as this recreates or magnifies the ‘doom loop’), or (c) 
have to merge with a sound bank, also cross-border, or (d) obtain new capital from capital 
markets as – given the new tough supervision – banks will be forced to have a sound 
business model. If any public funding  for survival under the new supervision would still be 
inevitable, the questions are whether the fiscal backstop via state aids (disciplined by tough 
state aid rules) would suffice, and whether the ESM would come, and to what extent.  
                                                          
38 Besides the experience and knowledge of national banks, which national authorities have, other reasons 
include that bankruptcy laws are national (and different) and not all Member States dispose, as yet, of the clear 
authority to impose bail-in as required by the BRRD.  This will take some time for implementation. Anyway, the 
sheer amount of work of the full assessment, with its incredible details, demands decentralised, yet tightly 
coordinated, execution of the reviews of banks.  
39 The following is based on the most recent debate on this subject and hence still somewhat preliminary. See 
e.g. Veron (2013a ; 2013b; 2014), Leipold (2013), Micossi, Bruzzone & Carmassi (2013), Gandrud & Hallerberg 
(2013a ; 2013b) ; Merler & Wolff (2013) ; Gros (2013a ; 2013b ; 2013c; 2013d) ; Emerson & Giovannini (2013), 
Kool (2014)  
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The 128 big banks are thought to cover around 85% of all bank assets in the EU (which 
means that nearly 6000 other ones, supervised by the EBA, with the ECB in the background 
but with residual powers, control only some 15 %). The ECB role is mainly justified because 
the large banks (‘too big to fail’)  might represent systemic risks and hence cause financial 
instability.  Therefore, the ECB is split into a supervisory part and a monetary part; the 
former will only take over some tasks from the EBA  and the national supervisors in it.  
The new supervisory regime cannot be effective without resolution powers and funding for 
that. The present paper cannot go into more than the basics of the emerging EU resolution 
regime, as it has been agreed. There were two proposals: (a) the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM); (b) the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD)40.  
The SRM has a two-tier structure: at EU level there is a Single Resolution Board (which can, if 
necessary, directly intervene if national foot dragging takes place), the Commission (deciding 
when and how resolution will take place; note that the Commission is a member of the 
Board as well)  and the Single Resolution Fund, funded by banks over a ten years period and 
expected to end with € 55 billion.  
At national level,  the resolution authorities will have to execute the resolution plan. As 
noted, the core principle of EU resolution is ‘bail-in’, with back-up by national authorities. 
Gradually, the SRF would be able to take over. Of course, it is important to keep in mind 
what resolution funds – also the SRF – ought to do and not to do. The SRF is not meant to 
serve as a remedy for the chronic undercapitalisation of (many) European banks.  So, if a 
bank goes into resolution, the SRF  should merely provide bridge money – it is neither there 
to compensate shareholders nor to recapitalise the bank fully41. It should merely support a 
restructuring or a split between a bad and a sound bank or bridge a short period before a 
complex merger (a rescue merger). For such purposes, the money needed is likely to be 
modest and could be returned fairly quickly too.  
Nevertheless,  fears exist in the EU  that there is a time inconsistency problem. The triple 
preparatory test imposed by the ECB& EBA takes place during the first half of 2014 or 
perhaps into the autumn. Expectations are that the ECB will uncover a number of non-viable 
banks or at least banks that would require resolution measures of some kind, typically cases 
where national supervisors avoid or postpone such action42. In a revealing analysis, Acharya 
& Steffen (2014) show empirically that, for a sample of 109 of the 128 banks, the capital 
needs (without stress tests) would amount somewhere between € 7.5 bn and € 66.8 bn, 
                                                          
40 For the proposals, see COM (2013) 520 of 10) July 2013 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure 
for the resolution of credit institutions (etc.) and COM (2012) 280 of 6 June 2012 on bank recovery and 
resolution (etc.), both enacted on 15 April 2014 in adapted form.   
41 It is not desirable but – as Gros (2013d) points out – it is also out of the question if several bigger banks 
would go into resolution, with public money. The banking system in Europe under the SSM has total assets of 
nearly € 25 000 billion, whereas their capital amounts to some € 1000 (hence, 4%). The ECB might impose 6% 
eventually.  
42 Incidentally, that is one reason why some observers advocate that national resolution bodies be independent 
under statute, preferably based on EU rules.  
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based on a capital ratio of 8%43. If the ECB will stick to 6%, it is unlikely that much of this 
would be needed or it can easily be solved.  However, the picture drastically changes once 
stress tests are employed. In four stress tests, capitalisation needs would vary anywhere 
between € 82 bn and € 767 bn (the latter with a required 7% capital ratio, which is rather 
prudent). The authors also emphasise  that prevailing risk weighting of assets would have to 
be reviewed first, as these weight my result in too rosy results in some cases.   
If this analysis would be even approximately correct, a problematic situation would arise: 
late 2014 there will not yet be a single resolution regime yet in place or in force, hence no 
Single Resolution Fund. One awkward scenario is a tough central supervisor (the ECB) finding 
itself dependent on national resolution authorities to act. This dependency will only be 
short-lived, until the resolution regime/ fund will come into force.  
Nevertheless, precisely in this short period it might undermine credibility and/or lead to 
open frictions about what banks have to die or be restructured. This might also shift the 
issue to the EU competition authority (the Commission’s DG Competition) having published 
state-aid guidelines on ‘bail-in’ in August 2013. Yet, all this is exactly what was to be 
prevented – resolution by supervisors and specialized resolution bodies is much to be 
preferred to state-aids and faster, too.  
Also,  the pressure on the ESM might intolerably increase, dependent on how many 
‘skeletons’ or ‘zombie banks’ the ECB might uncover. This prospect might, in turn, lead the 
ECB to be a little less tough which might damage its reputation from the outset. It is hard to 
say how realistic such scenarios would be. Every year the European banks disparately 
attempt to strengthen their core capital  and one additional year might help somewhat.  But 
this implies that banks withhold credit, thereby throttling the EU exit from the crisis and 
creating a Japan-like very-low-growth economy for years. The core issue should be whether 
there might be a systemic question or not. In case EU financial stability is not endangered  
and the issue at stake is the resolution of an individual bank, or even several ones, one can 
credibly argue that public money should not come in.  Bail-in  and such restructuring that 
capital markets are again willing to help recapitalise or to organize a merger/takeover, 
should be sufficient and EU resolution money should merely serve as bridge finance. With 
bigger banks, some public money might eventually be required but this should be 
conditional upon restructuring  and returning to a sound business model.  
The resolution regime as now foreseen has two defining features: supranationalism (Board is 
powerful, can directly intervene, and votes with simple majority, no vetoes)  and market-
based (bail-in and in principle, no aids). Such a regime will decisively undo the ‘deadly 
embrace’. But the supranationalism is less firm than one would wish to see44. The benefits 
                                                          
43 The authors use 4.5 of core Tier 1 ratio, plus a capital conservation buffer of another 2.5%  plus a 1% 
surcharge for systemically relevant banks.  
44 Kool (2014) points out that any substantial call on the resolution fund will require a decision from the plenary 
of its Board  (i.e. all relevant Member States); the European Council and the Commission may trigger a special 
blockage of the Board’s decision  in exceptional cases. However, it should be noted that the text is written for 
weekend decision making. Not only would a SRB decision have overruled the Commission, as a member of the 
Board, the Council gets only 24 hours to respond; even then,  the SRB is expected to modify its decision, which 
might still mean that resolution would proceed in  an adapted version.  
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are three. First, finally the EU can deliver quick and effective decision-making in crises, with 
much more limited funds than needed under the great uncertainty in Europe in the period 
2008 – 2012. Second, from now on, a central body can build up expertise from cases in  the 
vast EU market, rather than the rare domestic instances, and this functionally without 
capture. Third, the regime protects tax payers  and creates a level playing field in all 
participating countries. It is unclear whether and when an EU-wide deposit insurance 
guarantee system would be established that would underpin the ESM and the resolution 
fund. Once harmonisation is in force (expected by the spring of 2014), however, bank runs 
are discouraged even more and the national systems can extend loans to one another.  
 
6.   What serious issues need no ‘unions’?  
Having dealt with the fiscal and the banking union (and taking the monetary union, in this 
paper, for granted), this leaves four other ‘unions’: economic union, the ‘competitiveness’ 
union, the political union  and a social union. I shall be relatively short on those. 
6.1    Economic union 
The economic union is a vague term with many distinct interpretations since the late 
1940s45. It became (more) connected to monetary union since the Werner report  and, ever 
since, the term EMU is used routinely in Europe and beyond, without giving the ‘E’ of it too 
much thought. Yet, in the Werner report the ‘economic union’ cannot be taken serious. It 
can easily be shown that, if the monetary union proposed by Werner would have been 
based on the economic union from that report, it would have led to disaster46.  
The Maastricht treaty has formally introduced EMU, without however defining ‘economic 
union’. The relevant text in the current TFEU has remained unchanged. Initially, the de facto 
interpretation of economic union was heavily biased towards ‘budgetary’ aspects, say,  the 
deficit and debt rules for entry and the SGP. Of course, this cannot be appropriate for the 
simple reason that economic union must, in any event, comprise the single market as a 
whole, without which a monetary union would make little sense.  
However,  the budgetary discipline in the treaty is dealt with together with monetary union. 
Understandably, because the two principal reasons for budgetary discipline (as noted under 
‘fiscal union’, above) show that such discipline is to serve the proper functioning of the 
monetary union. Nowhere in the treaty is there a reference to the single market and possibly 
complementary features as central elements of the economic union47. Yet, a deep single 
market with a wide scope integrates the economy of the EU, including the Eurozone, and 
hence serves as the foundation of monetary union.  
The E of EMU is also likely to comprise ‘economic policy coordination’, similarly for the 
better functioning of the monetary union, and, in a weaker form, even without it. This is the 
only element where the treaty explicitly refers to the link: in Art. 121/4, TFEU, when 
                                                          
45 See Pelkmans (1991) for a survey. 
46 In Pelkmans (2006), in Case Study 18.1, p. 383,   this is explained in detail. 
47 With some interpretation, one might read that in Art. 119, TFEU.  
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Member States’ economic policies are not consistent with the broad guidelines, they may “.. 
risk jeopardising the proper functioning of the economic and monetary union”. The 
economic coordination apparatus of the EU has become much more ambitious during the 
crisis, in particular with the European semester, in turn based on the Annual Growth Survey 
of December,  and the tighter interactions on all kinds of recommendations for Member 
States, including domestic reforms in many policy domains  and country-specific calls to 
better support the deepening of the single market.  
Therefore,  despite the lack of a strict definition of the E of EMU, the economic union is 
taken more serious today. If, for simplicity, we say that it comprises at least three important 
elements (single market, budgetary discipline, economic policy coordination), the conclusion 
is that all three have developed and become far more important than at the time of drafting 
the Maastricht treaty. Nonetheless, the reader should never forget that, more often than 
not,  the three elements are dealt with separately  and the semantics of ‘economic union’ 
are forgotten.  
6.2    The Competitiveness union 
The ‘competitiveness union’ is a misnomer. There are essentially two critical problems of 
‘competitiveness’ in the EU. First,  the usual meaning of competitiveness concerns 
companies. Of course, companies have strong incentives to stay ‘competitive’, otherwise 
they will not survive in the market place. EU policies should ensure and maintain a pro-
competitive environment over the entire Union in which markets can thrive, while 
minimizing market failures  and paying careful attention to fundamentals such as 
infrastructure and macro-economic stabilisation.  Clearly, this is of great importance at the 
national level, too.   
The single market disciplines Member States  in this respect but the reduced national 
regulatory autonomy is nevertheless still pretty important: a pro-competitive environment 
has to be ensured nationally as well. Moreover,  EU countries have significant discretion on 
tax powers, the welfare state and many other aspects, which may or may not be conducive 
to ‘competitiveness’ of enterprises.  The very open trade and investment policy of the Union 
has long exposed EU companies to external competition and massive incoming FDI48, which 
has stimulated EU business to retain high performance in many  sectors.  
The competitiveness union, or, the integrated framework for competitiveness brought up 
under the flag of a ‘genuine EMU’, is not really about this. Broader issues of competition 
policy, the single market, some common policies in trade, energy, transport, innovation all 
matter, but there is no compelling link with the genuine EMU.  
They would equally matter without a common currency. The second meaning of 
‘competitiveness’ is a macro-economic concept. In the crisis it became associated with 
‘macro-economic imbalances’ in the Eurozone. In the first decade of the euro, countries such 
                                                          
48 Of course,  also outflows of FDI and FDI stocks owned elsewhere in the world tend, on the whole,  help  
European companies to stay competitive.  
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as Greece, Spain and Portugal (Italy to a lesser extent) built up secular current account 
imbalances inside the euro area (see Figure 5).  
Figure  5. Macro-economic imbalances on current accounts of Eurozone countries 
(before the crisis, 1996 – 2006) 
 
Source :  European Commission (2009) 
This is likely to imply two things : first, given the absence of nominal exchange rates inside 
the euro area, the expected adjustment processes via the real effective exchange rates 49 did 
not seem to work effectively because no corrections emerged even after a decade.  
Second, such steady imbalances have to be financed and apparently, in the Eurozone, banks 
and other suppliers of funding were happily financing net positions (at Eurozone interest 
rates) until the crisis broke out, without too many worries about bubbles and exposure to 
risk. In the early phase of the crisis, the prospects for many private investment plans were 
re-assessed. This led to a collapse of construction and other subsectors,  and with it to 
insolvencies, in turn, leading to many non-performing loans with numerous banks in the rest 
of the Eurozone.  
Later analysis clarified that, in part, this ‘lack of (macro) competitiveness’ was also due to 
wage increases (for years) paid above the growth of productivity, an unsustainable strategy. 
Nonetheless, much was attributed to the lack of competitive exposure in ‘sheltered’ non-
tradable sectors and to rigidities in adjustments, calling for deep national reforms. The basic 
problem in the EU /Eurozone is that such reforms are typically involving many national policy 
competences. Resistance to deep reforms can thus negatively affect the Eurozone, in 
particular , its macro-economic record via these interdependencies. That is the reason why 
the macro-economic imbalances procedure has been introduced, in order to pre-empt a 
refusal to reform, to follow reforms closely and the minimize the consequences, even 
though many reforms fall under domestic powers. 
                                                          
49 This is a complex area of economic analysis. For present purposes, such adjustments via REERs may take 
several forms or combinations, e.g. wage and/or price reactions, relative sectoral wage and price movements, 
shifts between tradable and non-tradable, etc. , in turn, requiring a considerable degree of market flexibility for 
such processes to work smoothly.  
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However, in the case of the MED countries,  the rescue finance they received (Greece, 
Portugal) or the attempts to prevent such rescue funding (with all its strict conditionalities) 
(Italy, Spain), have led to faster and more immediate reforms under pressure. In a way, one 
might interpret this as a late attempt to enhance market flexibility in the currency zone so as 
to improve adjustment processes50. Although of course the term  ‘competitiveness union’ 
makes no sense, it is true that the crisis has confirmed the need for close coordination of 
national economic policies in the Eurozone for their common collective good (the euro) to 
remain of high quality. A lack of macro-economic ‘competitiveness’  in the precise sense of 
avoiding secular current account deficits inside the Eurozone is one of the leading concerns.  
The new macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) in the six-pack is designed to address 
the issue51 . Most structural reforms fall under national powers but the MIP has introduced 
light sanctions at the end of the road. One might interpret the MIP approach to (macro) 
competitiveness as an incentives-based rather than a sanction-based approach52. This is 
confirmed by a recent Commission proposals on a convergence and competitiveness 
instrument  as well as on tighter coordination53.  At the same time, it should be realized that 
the current adjustment of imbalances is hardly or not determined by the impact of the 
ongoing structural reforms in MED countries, but rather by costly one-sided contraction of 
the deficit countries (see Figure 6, showing very fast improvements for MED countries and 
Ireland, essentially by sharp contraction). 
Figure  6. Restoring macro-economic competitiveness in the Eurozone 
 
Source :  BIS (2013, 21). Macro-competitiveness here is based on the ECB indicator : effective exchange rate vis 
a vis major trading partners and other euro area members, deflated by unit labour costs. Others = P, IRE  and 
GR. 
                                                          
50  As suggested by certain elements of the optimum currency area theory.  
51 The macro-economic imbalances procedure is found in Regulation 1176/2011 of 16 Nov. 2011. For the 
complicated Scoreboard for its surveillance, see European Economy, Occasional Papers 92 of February 2012. 
The regular Alerts have been both on secular deficits on the current accounts and on surpluses (like the  
newest Alert of 13 Nov 2013, e.g. on Germany  ; see Gros & Busse (2013) for critical comments). 
52 See e.g. Gruener (2013)  and  Vandenbosch (2013)  
53 See European Commission (2013c ; 2013d). 
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6.3    The ‘social union’ 
The ‘social union’  is not a concept that fits today’s  EU or, for that matter, the Eurozone. The 
term ‘social union’ was employed when Germany entered the process of unification of East 
and West Germany in 1990 based on  a political, monetary  and social union. This made 
sense, even though the specific terms of this ‘union’ were undoubtedly far too optimistic54  
at the outset. It made sense because the new Germany is one single country, with a common 
centralized tax system (based on the full  recognition of solidarity between Germans) and 
with one regime of social charges and allowances, with a single labour market and a single 
welfare state.  
Nothing even remotely similar applies to the EU. The EU has few powers in social policy, 
harmonisation in some domains (e.g. social security) is even forbidden, its social/ labour 
regulations are practically all minimum ‘standards’  (except occupational health and safety), 
the relations between the social partners exist at both national and EU level but are strictly 
national when it comes to wages settlements and some other aspects, EU cannot tax or 
impose social charges  and it has no budget whatsoever to pursue even a minimalistic 
welfare state. A subsidiarity test would swiftly find that this current state of affairs is justified 
and rational, given limited cross-border movement of workers, very diverse preferences 
between EU countries as well as different levels of development, which would (in case of a 
social union)  imply major cross-border social transfers.  
Why then the call for a ‘social union’? There has long been a fear that, without either 
budgetary or binding coordination instruments at EMU level, the euro would have the effect 
of undermining partially the national socio-economic ‘compacts’ (implicit or explicit) in 
participating Member States.  
This fear has arisen from a combination of strict budgetary discipline  and ‘internal 
devaluation’ (via the REER, often by wage cutting and labour shedding) as the dominant 
form of intra euro zone adjustment, in the absence of exchange rates. Since the crisis,  the 
model of national budgets generating macro-economic stabilisation via offsetting spending 
has proven a failure. Of course,  this could have been prevented, had there been sound 
supervision of banks and strict adherence of the SGP.  But the fact is that that did not 
happen  and the new architecture of EMU is meant for a future crisis, or, rather to prevent 
or minimize a future crisis.  
So,  the defects of EMU and a sad lack of effective decision-making led to a sharp hike in 
poverty rates precisely in the MED countries, as well as intolerably high youth jobless rates 
together with abrupt cuts in welfare states expenditures in a zero growth situation. Even the 
better performing euro countries saw their budgetary strategies falter due to bank rescues. 
The upshot was a pro-cyclical common move of imposed austerity with negative cross-
border spill-overs. Hence, a plea by some to set up some shared fiscal capacity of one kind or 
another, or an EU unemployment fund, so as to substitute at EU level for the current lack of 
stabilisation capacity at national level. Very cautiously, the European Council has agreed to 
                                                          
54 In particular, not only extending the West German welfare state to former East Germany but in addition 
pushing very rapid wage increases for the East far above their productivity levels at the time.  
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more agile monitoring (with scoreboards and ‘more’ attention for social aspects in EMU, 
including more involvement of social partners e.g. in the European semester).  
According to Commissioner Andor (social affairs), the Commission is even preparing a 
technical study of an EU unemployment benefit scheme55 but whether this would be voted 
through any time soon and properly funded seems everybody’s guess. To begin with,  the 
Lisbon treaty lacks a legal base for it. For it to have non-trivial stabilisation effects, the 
funding ought to be bigger than Member States would allow; for it not to develop into 
permanent transfers – given the grassroots resistance to such a course in many euro 
countries –  its design would have to be like an insurance fund.  
The fundamental problem is that the EU or the Eurozone is not ready for such (even 
minimal) fiscal federalism. The better design of (the genuine) EMU should result in less 
dramatic slumps in future, but the social pain will remain at the level where the 
competences are: the Member States. Some other authors56 envisage a cooperative 
European Social Union, giving the EU an explicit social purpose, with e.g. minimum social 
standards (but national models applying those), greater social investment  and more 
mainstreaming of the social dimension in all EU policies. Eurozone adjustments ought to be 
more balanced between deficit and surplus countries. However,  one can also take the view 
that the best EU social policy in the Eurozone is to firmly pre-empt such crises,  and the very 
costly pro-cyclical handling of it,  by better justified rules, supervision and the preventive 
policies of the MIP  and faster decision-making on rescue funds and the like. In other words,  
even when new crises might occur, they would be far less deep and the Eurozone capability 
to tackle the issues would prevent so many job losses and social misery.  
6.4   The political union  
‘The’ political union is little more than a label, which may hide almost any concept. But this is 
not merely an academic luxury, there is also a painful precedent. It should be remembered 
that the EU established a negotiation track on ‘political union’ during the 1990 process 
leading to the Maastricht treaty, besides the track on EMU. Exactly the same absence of 
even the most elementary commonness of purpose or design compelled political leaders to 
stop this negotiation track after 9 months. This is not to say that EMU and its implications 
are somehow a-political. Of course they are not, but the core issues are about political 
legitimacy as well as accountability and there are many ways to address this.  For some 
economists57, political union is a direct corollary of EMU: it means a carefully circumscribed 
                                                          
55 Andor (2013). In European Commission (2013e, p. 11) some first suggestions on how the Commission is 
thinking are indicated. For a wide-ranging survey of all aspects of the social dimension of EMU, see Fernandes 
& Maslauskaite (2013). 
56 Vandenbroucke (2014), a former Belgian labour minister;  and Roth (2014), currently a minister in Germany, 
find that EMU should be complimented with a highly decentralised Social Union, with explicit reforms agenda’s 
as well, and balanced macro-economic adjustment (also for surplus countries in the Eurozone). 
57 A prominent author is Paul de Grauwe. For De Grauwe (2013), ‘political union’ would signify three critical 
changes in EMU governance. First, given the now accepted role of the ECB as lender of last resort, some degree 
of partial debt pooling ought to be accomplished (shows that euro countries ‘are serious in their intentions to 
stick together’). There are ways of doing this without much of a risk to tax payers of the stronger euro 
countries. Second, macro-economies policies, in particular for adjustment, have to become more symmetric. 
Putting the adjustment burden in a one-sided manner on deficit countries has created a deflationary bias and is 
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and selective shift of economic, spending and/or tax powers to the EU or Eurozone level, 
more balanced macro-economic adjustment  and some debt pooling or sharing risks.  
If defined in such a way, this would undoubtedly require some political decision-making at 
EU or Eurozone level, but why call this a ‘political union’? Or, perhaps for others, why call it 
an EU economic government? As if today, no political decisions on such matters are taking 
place. On the one hand, as the crisis has demonstrated clearly, the European Council  and 
the Euro Group have been taking decisions of a highly political character all along. And it is 
also undeniable that they have dramatically shifted their priorities, if not mind sets, about 
EMU and desirable degrees of centralisation.  
On the other hand, it so happens that precisely such powers – even when shifted in modest 
degrees – are politically very sensitive with voters (read: tax payers) and many domestic 
politicians. Giving the EU (even limited) tax power or a much higher budget will decisively 
not generate more political legitimacy. The now agreed (limited) degrees of debt pooling via 
bank resolution and the even more circumscribed pooling via borrowing from national 
deposit guarantee systems is only accepted precisely because it is very small in the longer 
run (if the system works as foreseen) and not applicable in the very short run. An EU-wide 
deposit guarantee insurance system has been removed from the EU agenda for the time 
being: that would strengthen risk pooling but is not feasible.  
Moreover,  the notion of ‘political union’, already vague and too easily subject to many 
interpretations, has not only been advocated as a result of ‘fiscal union’ (in the Eurozone or 
beyond) but recently also with respect to the new powers of the ECB.  For example, De 
Grauwe & Ji (2014) suggest yet another variant of the ‘political union’ idea, as a corollary of 
EMU, when they argue “… that the ECB is the ultimate guarantor of sovereign debt in the 
Eurozone”. As lender-of-the-last-resort (given OMT), the ECB should be made subordinate to 
the political power of elected politicians (as is the case in the US or the UK), because, in the 
case of a crisis, the sovereign has primacy over the central bank. In contrast, at the moment 
the ECB is fully independent, i.e. the ECB has primacy over the sovereigns;  the ECB may help 
sovereigns as lender-of-the-last-resort but this is not guaranteed  as the result of a politically 
legitimate  preference of EU/ Eurozone countries’ governments.  
This interpretation shows once again that ‘political union’  is a highly elastic notion:  it might 
be thought necessary for reasons of  domestic economic reforms in EU countries, for a larger 
common budget, for some EU tax power, for (greater) risk pooling, for ‘symmetric’ macro-
economic adjustment and for some ultimate control of the ECB in times of crisis.  Taking 
each one of these arguments separately,  a range of more typical EU solutions might be 
found without suggesting a ‘political union’. Taking them together would be different: in 
such a thought experiment, it seems hard to avoid the idea of much greater Europeanization 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
largely responsible for the double-dip recession, with great risks of social and political disturbance in some 
countries experiencing traumatic falls in real income and huge unemployment. Third, the long-run 
sustainability of the Eurozone depends on a fiscal union, not without but with some capacity of macro-
economic stabilisation. De Grauwe even speaks of ‘significant spending and taxing powers’ for the EU or the 
Eurozone. This might be linked with major resolution funds (with qualified majority voting!). Variations of this 
view have been presented by other colleagues.  
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of ‘economic government’,  whatever that might mean exactly. But just as ‘fiscal capacity’ 
was long an all-or-nothing taboo for shifting bank resolution to the EU level, now solved with 
a common Fund, other carefully targeted responses can be designed for the various aspects 
where seen as indispensable. For instance, even for the lender-of-last-resort function of the 
ECB, rather than deciding on a heavy-handed ‘political union’, a simple deal could be 
engineered at EU level, as follows:  the lender-of-last-resort function is legally incorporated 
in the statutes of the ECB, in exchange of adding an article similar to the ‘crise manifeste’ of 
the ECSC (art. 58). The latter article would make it possible, under strict institutional 
requirements, for the European Council, upon a substantiated proposal of the Commission 
(for which some minimum conditions would have to be fulfilled), to declare a ‘manifest 
crisis’ in the Eurozone or wider, which would give it authority to temporarily overrule the 
ECB, if there were a need of ample liquidity  and the ECB would resist that.  The power might 
perhaps never have to be exercised but the joint sovereigns would have ‘primacy’ when it 
matters. To call that a ‘political union’, however, seems far-fetched, whilst the ECB arsenal of 
instruments would no longer be controversial.  
 The question is whether today’s fiscal union, as discussed, and a fully-fledged  banking union 
would suffice.  This seems hard to answer as economists are divided on what is 
indispensable for EMU to serve the EU or Eurozone economy properly in the longer run. 
Critical here is the term ‘fully-fledged’, implying an EU-wide deposit insurance scheme 
backing up resolution powers as well as rapid decision-making about near-insolvent banks. 
Again, in the near future when risk pooling will be less risky, such a common system might 
become feasible. Again, to call that ‘political union’ is neither helpful not clarifying.  
For many others, mainly political  scientists and politicians, the focus should be on the 
political side, referring to various ambitions of organizing political legitimacy and 
accountability at EU level or at least for the Eurozone on a permanent basis. In a recent 
summary of such proposals58, a host of suggestions falls under this heading. Critical are the 
recognisability of euro decision-makers to voters (a single face for the euro), a single 
presidency of the EU (Commission and Council president the same person), election of the 
president by the EP, greater proportionality of seats in the EP (implying that larger countries 
carry more weight than today), creation of  a Eurozone assembly (with some prerogatives 
and strengthening accountability), a residual role for the EP in excessive deficit procedures 
and several proposals to give national parliaments a direct role (e.g. together with the EP or 
some of the latter’s  committees) in EMU affairs, in addition to their current role in the 
European semester at home. Without necessarily being against these types of proposals, 
one can maintain serious doubts whether the marginal changes at the EU level generate the 
legitimacy that is desired. The exception is found in a greater role of national parliaments. 
The question there is how to do this effectively.  
It is important to observe that these two new forms of thinking on ‘political union’ seem to 
be moving on parallel tracks, without being linked. However, it goes without saying that a 
considerable shift of spending and some tax powers to the EU or Eurozone level is 
impossible and undesirable without concomitant political representation powers: ‘no 
                                                          
58 Chopin, Jamet & Priollaud (2012).  For a quite pessimistic view on political  legitimacy, see Crum (2013). 
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taxation without representation’. Surprisingly, this crucial insight seems (still) absent in both 
tracks. Bringing national parliaments in might help, dependent on how this is done. But a 
new treaty amendment precisely about such aspects would appear to be out of the question 
at the moment; if not the drafting of an agreed text (say, in a Convention), then in any event 
in the ratification, including some ten or more national referenda. Moreover, one might also 
connect these considerations with a more intense EU social dimension, e.g. an EU 
unemployment fund or specific tasks with respect to youth unemployment (as recently 
expanded in a modest way by the European Council with a budget of € 8 bn) and/or a 
greater role of social partners in EMU.  
 
7.   Conclusions  
The EU is presently going through a genuine transformation, on the road to a ‘genuine EMU’. 
The crisis and its aftermath in Europe have broken some political, regulatory, institutional 
and monetary taboos, altered preferences of Member States and generated a strategic long 
run vision of what a ‘genuine EMU’ implies. There is a deep ambiguity in Europe about a 
‘genuine EMU’. On the one hand, zero or negative growth at first and the slow emergence 
from the second ‘dip’ as well as the depressively high unemployment in many EU countries 
prevent a wide recognition of this remarkable transformation. Most of all, this is true at the 
grassroots level – rightly or wrongly, few people care as the euro(zone) has lost too much 
credibility given the misery it seemed to have caused. On the other hand, the many changes 
already introduced in the budgetary and institutional ‘acquis’, the progress on the banking 
union (including some ‘fiscal capacity’ at EU level for bank resolution) and the amazing 
evolution of the tasks and influence of the ECB have not fully removed doubts about the 
sufficiency of the accomplishments.  These doubts concern the shifts of economic powers, 
the tendency to go ‘intergovernmental’ or the democratic legitimacy and accountability of 
process and overall socio-economic strategy.  
Progress has surely been made and it is impressive for EU specialists realizing where EMU 
governance and substance came from only 5-6 years ago. One of the astounding aspects 
consists of the steady further deepening and widening of the single market, too little noticed 
and perhaps too splintered in the many steps ahead, but eventually of importance as the 
foundation of a sound EMU. And this despite the Great recession. But precisely in the 
financial internal market, a severe setback has occurred and it is crucial that this setback be 
reversed fully. The fiscal union, as agreed step by step, signifies considerable progress in 
terms of budgetary disciplines  and a breakthrough with respect to fiscal capacity for bank 
resolution powers combined with ‘bail-in’. The EP has reduced the intergovernmental and 
counterproductive complexities of the Banking Union, as preferred by Member States, 
somewhat.  
The banking union has been accomplished with respect to better supervision (rules and 
centralisation), EU level resolution powers and funding (again, based on bail-in first).  But 
some turbulence might be expected when the ECB tests (on the assets quality review  and 
later stress tests) find (big) banks that are technically insolvent and will have to restructure, 
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merge, be recapitalised or die. Precisely in this early period the resolution funds are not yet 
available, risking a confrontation with the Member States.  
However, recognizing the transformation of EMU  and related EU-wide banking supervision  
and resolution, is one thing. The initial framing of the ‘genuine EMU’ was nevertheless 
oversold, suggesting that a parade of other ’unions’ would be needed in its wake.  
A review of four ‘unions’ – economic union, competitiveness union,  social union  and 
political union – brings out that this kind of framing is at the very least not useful, if not 
misleading. The first two are anything but clear  and the issues involved are not new. The 
macro-economic imbalances procedure (MIP) and the ESRB are worthwhile improvements 
over the pre-crisis disregard of macro competitiveness and of systemic risks. The three 
components of what presumably is an ‘economic union’ (single market, economic policy 
coordination and budgetary disciplines) have all been strengthened step by step. The last 
two ‘unions’, on the other hand, would imply a fundamental change in the conferral of 
powers by the Member States to the EU /Eurozone, with drastic long-run implications. 
Hence, neither a social nor a political union worthy of the name will be pursued. There are 
solutions to the issues often said to be in need of a ‘political union’, which are targeted, 
without being too intrusive or quasi-federalist.   
At present, the EU leadership only  discusses some marginal changes seriously. There is a risk 
in this paralysis, as political legitimacy (‘we have never been asked’) and accountability 
undoubtedly have to be strengthened, especially via involvement of national parliaments. At 
the same time, it is also crystal-clear that, nowadays, it will be very difficult to strengthen 
convincingly EMU’s political legitimacy with the grassroots. The core problem for the 
grassroots is their disillusion with the political elites in Europe, national and European alike, 
but the EU remains an easier culprit.  
There are many reasons for this disillusion but one is certainly the lack of direct and serious 
debates about the EU and the euro at grassroots level. Only eurosceptics do this, as they 
attempt to organize the discontents. But even the BREXIT debate in the UK, where the 
eurosceptics had some difficulty in arguing their case on facts, has not helped much, as their 
voters tend to vote emotionally. The new European Parliament will have to cope with 
eurosceptics in much larger numbers than before. This will sharpen the debate about the 
‘genuine’ EMU, although it need  not render the process of completing the ‘genuine EMU’ 
more difficult, given the large majority of MEPs  interested in making the euro and the single 
market work better and given targeted solutions to specific aspects of EMU. What is more 
problematic in such an environment is to argue for still more unions, let alone unions which 
are nebulous and subject to many interpretations,  and which are either not necessary or 
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